THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 01349-84 29 February 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH:

National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM:

John Horton

National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT:

Warning and Forecast Report for Latin America

February 1984

1. The following items were discussed at the Warning and Forecast Meeting held on 22 February 1984.

Chile

- 2. The holiday season in Chile was unusually active. From the leftist opposition, there were bombings, forest fires set, and attacks on police stations. There was also right-wing terrorism such as fire-bombings of churches. While the economy seems to be picking up, a peso devaluation is rumored, copper prices are low, and unemployment remains a critical issue.
- 3. We see prospects for a political confrontation in Chile in the next few months as better than 50/50. The National Workers Council (CNT) is planning a protest on 27 March, and a strike is being considered for April. The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) could also pull off some dramatic actions. May Day is an occasion for protests and 11 May -- the anniversary of the first Day of Protest in 1983 -- could provide the focus for violent demonstrations. Moreover, there will be the June anniversary of the copper workers strike.

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4. brewing	The following developments would indicate that a serious crisis is in Chile.
	Major changes in the political parties law by President Pinochet.
	The resignation of Interior Minister Jarpa.
••	The use of transitory articles rather than judicial procedures to deal with opposition political or labor activities.
	Verbal or physical attacks on the church, on rights, or on political activity.
	Widespread support for a national strike, cutting across class and regional lines.
	Firing of military personnel for political remarks.
there are	General Humberto Mej¶a seems to be in a slightly stronger position, s he is toward elections. He has the support of the military, and e few signs of unrest at senior and middle levels. although less is as usual of the junior ranks.
as expec looks as	The IMF Agreement could lapse because tax revenues are not as high ted. This would create serious political problems for Mejia, but it though he will hang on.

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- 7. There has been less violence on the part of the military in late 1983, but right-wing parties, with governmental personnel involved, did indulge in violence--probably beyond Mejia's control. In an unusual practice, the government has published lists of those they have detained and has even released some of them. With the election campaign coming on, an increase in violence can be expected.
- 8. The election is scheduled for 1 July, and how it will be perceived will be much affected by the level of violence. The elections for the constituent assembly will probably be honest, with the better organized rightwing parties—Sandoval's Movement of National Liberation (MLN) particularly—being victorious. The more centrist parties are still disorganized and those more to the left are losing their momentum. Voting will be lighter in the western highlands, where the Indians are, and heavier in Guatemala City and in the eastern provinces.
- 9. Guerrilla activity continues its cyclic pattern. There were ambushes of government forces by the insurgents in December and January, but they seemed to run down about the third week in January. The Government dispatched forces to Petén which put the querrillas there in disarray

Ine Guerrilla Army of the People (EGP) is factionalized and the Communist Party (PGT) is split again. They are not likely to constitute a major threat to the government over the next six months.

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major threat to the government over the next six months.

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El Salvador				
their military act and polling places broader military c	ement of Guillermo Un ssentially meaningles ivity. There probabl on election day, but ampaign. An attack o efore the election is	s. We expect the y will be some har this will be inci n a departmental c	guerrillas to keep up rassment of voters dental to their	
14 Attached	are coordinated Inte	lligonco Community	actimates of	
government and ins note that subseque Salvadoran Army wa level up to 40,000 resulting in a tot total active duty	urgent force strength nt to our session on s increased to 27,300). A number of adjust al active duty force military and security nsurgents) are UNCLAS	s in Central Americ 22 February, the to (bringing the total tments were made to estimate of 280,000 personnel (as wel	ca and Cuba. Please otal for the al active duty force of the Cuban figures.	
15. For your Conference the wee Wednesday, 28 Marc	information, due to a k of 19 March, the nea h.	a National Intelliq xt Warning Meeting	gence Council will be held on	
				2
Attachments: A. Government a	nd Insurgent Forces in	n Central America		
February 19	84			25 X ′

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GOVERNMENT AND INSURGENT FORCES IN CENTRAL AMERICA, February 1984

COUNTRY	ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES	ARMED INSURGENTS	
Guatemala	43,000		25 X ′
Honduras	22,000	*	
El Salvador	40,000	9,000 - 11,000	
Nicaragua	49,000		25 X 1
Costa Rica	8,000	*	
Cuba	280,000		

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^{*} No active insurgency, but several hundred radical leftists probably are armed.

MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND CUBA February, 1984

GUATEMALA

Active Duty P	ersonnel
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Army	26,900
Air Force	750
Navy and Marines	980
Mobile Military Police	3,000
National Police	9,500
Treasury Police	1,900
Total	43,030
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Others

Army Reserve	10,000
Air Force Reserve	200
Civilian Defense Forces	500,000*

^{*}Less than 5 percent have small arms.

HONDURAS

Active Duty Personnel

	Army Air Force	14,600 1,300
	Navy and Marines Public Security Forces	850 5,000
Total		21,750

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Active	Duty	Personne 1
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Army	27,300
Air Force	500
Navy	500
Treasury Police	1,800
National Police	5,500
National Guard	4,200

Total

39,800

Others

Civil Defense Forces

(a few thousand) (60,000 to 100,000 inactive reservists) Territorial Service

NI CARAGUA

Active Duty Personnel Ground Forces

Ground Forces			_	20,000
(Army and Ministry				
Reserves		12,000	-	16,000
Militia		5,000		10,000
Air and air defense	forces	•		1,750
Navy				500
Police	_			5,000
Police				5,000

Total

43,750 - 53,250

Others

Unmobilized Reserves (armed)	10,000 -	12,000
Organized Militia (unarmed)	9,000 -	11,000
Other Militia	30,000 -	40,000

COSTA RICA

Active Duty Personnel

Civil	Guards Guards	4,800 3,200
		0.000

Total

8,000

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CUBA

Active Duty Personnel Army (regulars) Army (ready reserve) Air Force and air defendance Navy MININT Police	110,000 - 120,000 110,000 - 135,000 nse forces 18,500 12,500 2,500 - 3,000 12,000
Total	265,500 - 301,000
Others Militia Youth Labor Army Civil Defense Border Guards Police Auxiliary	600,000 100,000 50,000 - 100,000 3,500 52,000

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